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Framing Preglimony:
Exploring the Implications of Pregnancy Support Models
through Family Law Values
CANDICE MARIE REDER*
INTRODUCTION
If two people equally contribute to a risk-taking endeavor, should they equally
divide the risk?
In the summer of 2012, University of Richmond law professor Shari Motro
ignited a media firestorm over one word: “preglimony.”1 In a New York Times
column, Motro argued that unmarried lovers who conceive should share
economic responsibility for the woman’s pregnancy. The financial burden of
pregnancy should be shared in proportion to each party’s relative assumption of
risk that a pregnancy would occur—which is to say, equally.2 Motro coined the
term “preglimony” to encapsulate this concept in a single word by conjuring the
similar and more familiar concept of alimony (the shared economic responsibility
between former spouses at divorce).3
Her proposal was met with outrage, indignation, skepticism or, at the very
least, debate over implementation of such a new concept.4 The thing is, despite

*
J.D., Duke University, 2013.
1. Shari Motro, Responsibility Begins at Conception, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2012, at A17, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/07/opinion/time-for-pregnancy-support-alimony.html?_r=0.
Motro originally developed the concept of preglimony through a series of law review articles. See
Shari Motro, The Price of Pleasure, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 917 (2010) [hereinafter Price of Pleasure]; Shari
Motro, Preglimony, 63 STAN. L. REV. 647 (2011) [hereinafter Preglimony].
2. See Motro, supra note 1.
3. See id.
4. It only took one day for news agencies, father’s rights advocates, feminist groups, and a
large number of bloggers to begin posting their challenges or support for Motro. See Motro: Men Pay
Alimony,
Why
Not
Preglimony?,
TAXPROF
BLOG
(July
7,
2012),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/07/motro-men-pay-.html; James Taranto, Shotguns
Without Weddings: A NEW YORK TIMES Plan for Encouraging Illegitimate Births, WALL ST. J., (July 9, 2012,
4:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303343404577516864197211988.html; W.F.
Price, Law Professor Proposes “Preglimony”, THE SPEARHEAD (July 9, 2012), http://www.thespearhead.com/2012/07/09/law-professor-proposes-preglimony/ (calling preglimony “a bid to
further expand wealth transfer from males to females”); Katie Roiphe, Preglimony and Pro-Choice
Rhetori: If We Make Fathers Pay for Pregnancies, Aren’t We Calling the Fetus a Baby?, SLATE (July 10, 2012,
6:32 AM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/roiphe/2012/07/preglimony_and_how_it_
affects_the_pro_choice_movement_.html (labeling Motro’s op-ed as “eminently sensible and
humane” but expressing concern about whether preglimony admits that a fetus is “life”); Glenn
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critics’ denouncement of preglimony as “laughable,”5 “stupid,”6 “inequitable,”7
or “another front . . . in never-ending gender wars,”8 preglimony is not that novel
of an idea. For example, unwed fathers are sometimes required to reimburse
pregnancy-related expenses under current child support regimes, such as
doctor’s visits and delivery costs.9 However, those child support models do not
account for all of a pregnancy’s impact on the mother. Motro reinforces her call
for preglimony by demonstrating ways in which existing child support schemes
are inequitable to unmarried pregnant women because the financial burden of a
pregnancy is unevenly divided between the responsible parties. Because these
women have no legal entitlement to support and are not benefitting from an
assumed shared economic union of marriage, unmarried pregnant women are
effectively disadvantaged by their marital status. Preglimony would correct for
this inequity by requiring fathers, equal contributors to the pregnancy, to take
responsibility for an equally-divided portion of the pregnancy’s costs.
If legislators were planning to adopt a preglimony scheme, they would have
to decide whether to frame preglimony as an obligation to the mother or as an
obligation to the child-to-be. There are different implications for each frame.
Motro argues for the former,10 justifying preglimony along similar grounds as
alimony rather than as an extension or augmentation of current child support
obligations. The alimony framework generates strong resistance from some

Reynolds,
Comment
to
Katie
Roiphe,
INSTAPUNDIT
(July
11,
2012,
7:55AM)
http://pjmedia.com/instapundit/146394/ (arguing that fathers should have rights “[b]esides the
right to cough up the cash”); Cassandra, Preglimony & Sex Lead To Equal Opportunity Silliness, Part I,
VILLAINOUS
COMPANY
(July
11,
2012,
4:16
AM),
http://www.villainouscompany.com/vcblog/archives/2012/07/preglimony_sex.html
(critiquing
both Motro’s proposal and subsequent commentary); Cassandra, Preglimony: the Insanity
ContinuesFalsePart
Deux,
VILLAINOUS
COMPANY
(July
11,
2012,
8:31
AM),
http://www.villainouscompany.com/vcblog/archives/2012/07/preglimony_the.html (questioning
whether abortion rights can survive after preglimony); Robert Franklin, ‘Preglimony’: The Latest Front
in the ‘Mothers’ Rights/Fathers’ Responsibilities’ War, FATHERS AND FAMILIES (July 12, 2012, 9:03 AM),
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org/2012/07/12/preglimony-the-latest-front-in-the-mothersrightsfathers-responsibilities-war/ (arguing against preglimony from a father’s rights perspective);
Staff Reporter, Is Preglimony a Good Idea? ANNOTATIONS: A JONES MCCLURE PUBLISHING BLOG (Aug.
10, 2012), http://annotations.jonesmcclure.com/2012/08/10/is-preglimony-a-good-idea/ (calling
Motro’s column an “eyebrow-raising piece”).
5. Gamerp4, Comment to Law Professor Proposes “Preglimony”, THE SPEARHEAD (July 9, 2012,
3:14 PM), http://www.the-spearhead.com/2012/07/09/law-professor-proposes-preglimony/.
6. Reficul, Comment to Law Professor Proposes “Preglimony”, THE SPEARHEAD (July 9, 2012, 4:01
PM), http://www.the-spearhead.com/2012/07/09/law-professor-proposes-preglimony/.
7. Taranto, supra note 3.
8. Shady Grady, Comment to Preglimony: A Really Bad Idea??, URBAN POLITICO, (July 18, 2012,
11:46 AM), http://www.theurbanpolitico.com/2012/07/preglimony-really-bad-idea.html#comment591113293.
9. See discussion, infra, Part II. Although the specifics of pregnancy-related expense
reimbursement varies by state, a common theme among child support statutes is that only a subset of
total pregnancy-related expenses are eligible for reimbursement.
10. Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 919 (“Child Support obligations should kick in only once a
child is born: until and unless this happens, a man’s economic responsibility should be
conceptualized as a responsibility towards the woman herself.”); Preglimony, supra note 1, at 648 – 59;
see also discussion, infra, Part V.B–C.
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members of the public, who consider preglimony unfair to men.11 Other internet
commentary about preglimony indicates that the purpose of alleviating an
unequal burden on unmarried pregnant women is more controversial than
promoting the development of healthy babies. It is unclear, however, if public
opinion would shift in favor of preglimony even if it were framed as an
extension of current child support obligations, because some individuals express
a moral hesitancy to incentivize unmarried women for getting pregnant by
“rewarding” them with money.12
This note explores the implications of framing preglimony to be more
similar to alimony or to child support.13 Trends in American family law, such as
the focus on equality and enhanced accommodation for myriad forms of
caregiving beyond the nuclear family, make the eventual implementation of a
pregnancy support scheme seem inevitable. Understanding the subtle differences
between the two preglimony frameworks will help legislators and other policymakers decide which model best promotes the goals and values of their state.
I. CARE AND EQUALITY: VALUES AT THE FRONTIER OF FAMILY LAW
Family law is always evolving to reflect the values of the day. These values
are shaped by the realities of life. For example, the legal presumptions regarding
child custody have shifted over time to reflect changing values about parenting.
During colonial times, there was little separation between work and home. A
man was the head of a family, and his wife and children, as his property,
contributed to his livelihood while he was responsible for the home.14 This
patriarchal value—with a man holding the ultimate responsibility for his family’s
economic and domestic success—led to a custodial presumption in favor of
fathers even though women cared for their young children’s daily needs.15
Industrialization brought many changes as the separation of work and
home led to a new social conception of family. Because men’s economic duties
were physically separated from the home, women took over as head of the
domestic sphere.16 As the female role morphed into nurturer and homemaker,
courts responded by reconsidering the automatic award of child custody to

11. Taranto, supra note 3 (“Motro proposes to place new burdens on men without requiring
women to give up anything in return.”). See also Franklin, supra note 4 (“[E]ffectively, fathers’ ‘rights’
are in mothers’ hands.”).
12. See Taranto, supra note 3 (“Women would be encouraged to get pregnant.”).
13. See discussion, infra, Parts V and VI.
14. See Steven Mintz, From Patriarchy to Androgyny and Other Myths: Placing Men’s Family Roles in
Historical Perspective, in AMERICAN FAMILIES PAST AND PRESENT: SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON
TRANSFORMATIONS 11, 11–12 (Susan M. Ross, ed., 2006).
15. See id. at 12.
16. See id. at 18. (“The physical separation of the household and the workplace also contributed
to a new conception of the family and of men’s familial roles. . . . During the early nineteenth century,
family roles were reorganized around the idea of sexual difference, with men and women
increasingly occupying separate spheres. Prior to the nineteenth century, women had been active
participants in commerce, farming, and many business pursuits, assisting their husbands, keeping
books, overseeing apprentices and journeymen, and manufacturing many goods for sale.”).
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men.17 This resulted in what became known as the tender years presumption,
which assumed that mothers were the best caretakers for children unless proved
to be unfit.18
The modern trend is to base custody decisions on factors other than gender,
such as a gender-neutral primary caretaker presumption or best interest of the
child standard.19 While the factors may appear biased in favor of women over
men, this is a reflection of the reality that many women take on the majority of
childcare responsibilities.20 In a family where a father is the primary caregiver,
the factors would likely fall in his favor. The determination of child custody is
just one example, but it illustrates how the state offers rights and privileges to
families according to the societal values of the day.21 History teaches us that each
generation will change what it means to be a family and how families take care
of each other. Granting legal rights to families according to outdated values in an
attempt to resist modernization is futile. Rather than stubbornly ignoring the
signs of change, legislators should instead focus on how to adapt laws to
continue promoting public policy while accounting for the new realities of
American family life.
The reality of family life in America today is that marriage is losing its
primacy as the creator of familial connections. Marriage rates have been
dropping since the 1960s,22 and married households are no longer in the majority
in the United States.23 In the meantime, nontraditional family structures are
becoming more and more common: there are blended families,24 childless-bychoice families,25 cohabiting families,26 same-sex families,27 single-parent

17. Lisa J. McIntyre, The Civil Contract and Family Life in the United States, in AMERICAN FAMILIES
PAST AND PRESENT: supra note 14, at 155, 161 (“[J]udges took notice of society’s attachment to children
and women’s superiority in the domestic arena and began to rethink their expectations about the
relationship of children to their parents—especially with respect to the issue of custody.”).
18. Ariel Ayanna, From Children’s Interests to Parental Responsibility: Degendering Parenthood
Through Custodial Obligation, 19 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 9–10 (2012) (“Because it was presumed to be
right and natural that women raise young children, the idea of taking a child away from the care of
the woman who had been raising the child proved not only impractical but distasteful.”).
19. See id. at 12–13 (listing typical factors of the best interest of the child standard) and 17–19
(describing problems with the ostensibly gender-neutral primary caregiver standard).
20. See id. at 36 (noting that “primary caregiver” factors disadvantage men because they are less
likely to be the primary caregiver).
21. SUSAN M. ROSS, AMERICAN FAMILIES PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 16, at 3 (noting that the
history of transformations of family life make future transitions “inevitable”).
22. See generally ANDREW J. CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE-GO-ROUND: THE STATE OF MARRIAGE AND
THE FAMILY IN AMERICA TODAY 63-115 (2009).
23. DAPHNE LOFQUIST, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS: HOUSEHOLDS AND
FAMILIES 5 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-14.pdf
(describing a drop in married households from 52% of all U.S. households in 2000 to only 48% of all
households in 2010).
24. ALICE K. BUTTERFIELD, CYNTHIA J. ROCHA & WILLIAM H. BUTTERFIELD, THE DYNAMICS OF
FAMILY POLICY 289 (2010) (noting blended families as one of many new family forms in the United
States and emphasizing the need to focus on family function over structure, such as childcare
functions).
25. ROSS, supra note 21, at 4.
26. In the early 1980s, Martha Fineman argued for repeal of criminal laws punishing
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families,28 networked families, 29 multigenerational families and families with
non-parent caregivers.30 These families perform many of the same caretaking
functions as “traditional” nuclear families and with the same sense of
commitment and durability over time. Yet without a marital or blood bond, some
of these family forms have the same legal standing as friendship—none.31
Sociologist Judith Stacey points out that legal recognition for marriage but no
other family form is a zero-sum result: “[t]he more eggs and raiments our society
chooses to place in the family baskets of the married, the hungrier and shabbier
will be the lives of the vast numbers of adults and dependents who, whether by
fate, misfortune, or volition, will remain outside the gates.”32 Making legal
marriage the trigger for state recognition of family perpetuates inequalities. Some
families get benefits that they do not need while other families that need those
benefits are not entitled to them.33 This discrepancy between the reality that
families come in many forms versus the family forms that are recognized and
subsidized by the state leads to a privileging of some families over others.
A. Caretaking
A family’s main function is to take care of each other. In order to facilitate
the caretaking function, laws must be structured in a way that bestows the same
rights, privileges, and subsidies on all caregivers in all types of family structures.
This value of caretaking is at odds with calls for protection of traditional
marriage because caretaking is independent of marriage. There are many non-

cohabitation and creation of regulations comparable to marriage laws to protect the cohabiters
themselves. Martha L. Fineman, Law and Changing Patterns of Behavior: Sanctions on Non-Marital
Cohabitation, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 275, 276. To see the evolution of the cohabitation argument, see also
MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS
111 (2010) (exploring whether the rights and privileges reserved for marriage should be extended to
both same sex couples and cohabiting couples).
27. ROSS, supra note 21, at 4.
28. EICHNER, supra note 26, at 92–101 (arguing that the state should be careful not to privilege
two-parent families over single-parent families).
29. See generally KAREN V. HANSEN, NOT-SO-NUCLEAR FAMILIES: CLASS, GENDER, AND NETWORKS
OF CARE (2005) (exploring the dynamics of interdependent “networks of care” that help parents
balance child-rearing, work, and other responsibilities and pointing out that even two-parent families
are not independent, self-reliant units). See also JENNIFER ROBACK MORSE, LOVE & ECONOMICS: WHY
THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE FAMILY DOESN’T WORK 89 (2001) (arguing that “[t]here is literally no such thing as
a ‘single parent’” because “[s]ome third party is always in the background, helping the [single
parent]”).
30. BUTTERFIELD, ROCHA, & BUTTERFIELD, supra note 24, at 382 (calling baby boomers the
“sandwich generation” because they “provide care for dependent children and aging parents at the
same time”).
31. SANFORD N. KATZ, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 10 (2003) (noting that state legislatures opt to
regulate marriage but consider other committed adult relationships more like friendship than family,
with none of the privileges or protections of marriage).
32. Judith Stacey, Toward Equal Regards for Marriages and Other Imperfect Intimate Affiliations, 32
HOFSTRA L. REV. 331, 344 (2003); see also EICHNER, supra note 26, at 97-98 (acknowledging that
individuals lacking the “wherewithal and happenstance” to be in committed relationships are more
likely than married individuals to need social support funneled toward marriage).
33. Stacey, supra note 33, at 343.
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marital family forms that would benefit from the legal recognition and support
provided to marital family forms. There are opposing arguments about the best
way to encourage the caretaking function within families. Some traditionalists
call for a strong push toward marriage as the only way to protect families.34 They
cite statistics indicating that marital families are more strongly correlated with
stability than non-marital families.
On the other side of the debate is the argument that awarding legal
privileges and entitlements to marital families is arbitrary and does not
accurately reflect the distribution of caretaking across other family forms. These
arguments against marriage as the trigger for legal benefits arise from the fact
that dependency and vulnerability are universal human experiences. At the very
least, all of us are born vulnerable and dependent, and many of us will have
illness, injury, or other life events that require caretaking. Those who choose to
accept a caretaking role should be given the same legal benefits and entitlements
without arbitrary limits on what families are recognized and what families are
excluded.
At first, it appears that there is no common ground between proponents of
either side. But both sides share the value of caretaking—they just debate the
optimum way for the law to reflect this value.35 Policy makers may disagree over
the best form for a family, but the primacy of care is relatively undisputed.
The current trends for family law seem to be slowly moving away from a
marriage-centric approach. The value of care began to shift into public focus in
the early 1990s. Leading into the 1992 election, Vice President Dan Quayle
verbally attacked sitcom character Murphy Brown and other single mothers,
calling for a return to “traditional family values.”36 Candice Bergen, in her role as
34. See generally ALLAN CARLSON, CONJUGAL AMERICA: ON THE PUBLIC PURPOSES OF MARRIAGE
37 (2007) (insisting that the health and survival of our nation rests on recovery of the understanding
of marriage as the natural reproductive and economic unit).
35. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARNTERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW
129 (2000) (“Parenthood may play the part marriage once did of initiating young men and women
into a socially sanctioned role . . . . parenthood is a permanent relationship; it is also one of
dependence and trust.”); EICHNER, supra nota 26, at 61 (“[F]amilies should bear responsibility for the
day-to-day caring for (or arranging the care for) children and others with dependency needs.
Meanwhile, the state should bear the responsibility for structuring institutions in ways that help
families meet their caretaking needs . . .”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling With Equality: One
Feminist Journey, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY47, 52 (Martha Albertson Fineman, ed., 2011) (“Vulnerability is universal and constant. As
embodied individuals, we are all just an accidental mishap, natural disaster, institutional failure, or
serious illness away from descending into a dependent state.”); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender
55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 71 (1988) (“[M]en can connect to other human life. Men can nurture life. Men can
mother. Obviously, men can care, and love, and support, and affirm life.”);
36. Andre Dechert, Family Man: The Popular Reception of Home Improvement, 1991-1992, and the
Debate About Fatherhood, in INVENTING THE MODERN AMERICAN FAMILY: FAMILY VALUES AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN THE 20TH CENTURY UNITED STATES 265, 267 (Isabel Heinemann, ed., 2012). Quayle
supported his argument that “marriage is probably the best anti-poverty program of all” by saying,
“Bearing babies irresponsibly is simply wrong. . . . It doesn’t help matters when primetime TV has
Murphy Brown, a character who supposedly epitomizes today’s intelligent, highly paid professional
woman, mocking the importance of fathers by bearing a child alone and calling it just another
lifestyle choice. “ MICHAEL A. COHEN, LIVE FROM THE CAMPAIGN TRAIL: THE GREATEST PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN SPEECHES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND HOW THEY SHAPED MODERN AMERICA at 451-
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Murphy Brown, responded to Quayle’s attack by saying, “Perhaps it’s time for
the Vice President to expand his definition and recognize that, whether by choice
or circumstance, families come in all shapes and sizes.”37
In contrast to Quayle’s view, presidential candidate Bill Clinton pushed for
government solutions to some of the biggest problems facing women and
mothers, married or not. He earned women’s votes by promising to address
these problems for many types of families, ultimately winning the election.38
Clinton’s support for women led to better recognition of the value of caretaking
because his political initiatives brought attention to the large number of women
struggling under the burden of caring for children and others: the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program;39 the Family and Medical Leave Act;40 the
Violence Against Women Act;41 the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act;42
expansion of the Earned Income Tax Credit, which helped non-parental
caregivers;43 and enhanced federal child-support enforcement laws, which
presuppose a lack of marriage.44 By making support for caregivers regardless of
marital status the purpose of so many government initiatives, Clinton helped
shift the public’s concern from the traditional structure of a family to its
functionality—a functionality centered around care.45
B. Equality
While promotion of caretaking may be a core purpose of the family law
system, there are many paths toward that goal. The corollary value of equality
provides a measure to select which path to travel. Equality is a central concept to
American identity. It shapes many aspects of our legal system beyond family
law. Awareness of gender equality problems in family law are credited to the
civil rights and women’s rights movements.46 One of the first examples of the

51 (2008).
37. Isabel Sawhill, 20 Years Later, It Turns Out Dan Quayle Was Right About Murphy Brown and
Unmarried Moms, WASH. POST. (May 25, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201205-25/opinions/35457123_1_father-moves-marriage-biological-parents.
38. MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A NEW FAMILY POLITICS 46-47 (1999)
(highlighting the gender gap as a key piece of Clinton’s victory). It should be noted, however, that the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was also passed during Clinton’s administration.
39. State Children’s Health Insurance Program, Pub. L. No. 105-33, tit. XXI, 111 Stat. 251; see also
Elisabeth H. Sperow, Redefining Child Under the State Children’s Health Insurance Program: Capable of
Repetition, Yet Evading Results, 12 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 137, 139 (2004) (relaying that when
SCHIP was enacted it was considered “a landmark opportunity to improve children’s health” for
poor families that failed to qualify for Medicare).
40. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6.
41. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902.
42. Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694.
43. Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Defends Income Tax Credit Against G.O.P. Cut, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1995, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/19/us/clinton-defends-income-tax-creditagainst-gop-cut.html?src=pm (“Mr. Clinton has long cited the expansion of the credit as a major
underappreciated accomplishment of his Administration . . . .”).
44. HARRINGTON, supra note 38, at 47.
45. Id.
46. See KATZ, supra note 31, at 6–7 (noting that during the 60s and 70s an impressive number of
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infiltration of gender equality norms into family law was the passage of the
Married Women’s Property Acts in the 1850s. Before their passage, a woman’s
personal property, legal rights, and even legal existence were all transferred to
her husband upon marriage under the doctrine of coverture.47 The Married
Women’s Property Acts allowed married women to hold property separately
from their husbands.48 Nonetheless, remnants of coverture remained into the
1970s, when voter registration rules and other requirements denied women
certain rights and privileges for refusing to adopt their husband’s surnames.49
When women brought complaints about these requirements, some judges
(wrongly) believed that it was not only permissible to force women to change
their name, but also that it was sometimes required.50 These movements
solidified the importance of equality in family law and policy.
Equality is not just central to family law, it is also an important value in
American culture as a whole. For example, a “new” civil rights movement has
emerged promoting equal recognition for gay and lesbian families.51 Laws like
the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 200952 show that the fight for gender equality
is still being waged in the workplace. And 2012 was heralded as the “New Year
of the Woman” after the most recent election raised the total number of female
senators to twenty.53 From the workplace to politics, equality is such an
cases dealing with family law and relationships came before the Supreme Court). Same-sex issues are
bringing new attention to gender equality; the concept that children need both a mother and a father
has been criticized as an outdated concept of gender complementarity. EICHNER, supra note 26, at 95
(arguing that the gender of parents is inconsequential to the success of the child). Martha Albertson
Fineman argues that touting heterosexual marriage as necessary for children’s welfare demonstrates
the public “willingness to sacrifice women’s interests for children’s.” Id. at 97.
47. Patricia J. Gorence, Women’s Name Rights, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 876, 883 (1976).
48. KATZ, supra note 31, at 62. Despite the passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts,
however, most women remained “Nonpersons” because courts narrowly interpreted their new
rights. See Lisa J. McIntyre, The Civil Contract and Family Life in the United States, in AMERICAN
FAMILIES PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 17, at 159 (“[T]he acts were deemed not to erode the
husband’s right to control the family assets; nor did they provide married women the right to control
their own earnings or to contract without their husband’s consent.”).
49. See generally, Gorence, supra note 47, at 886–94, 896-97 (detailing “recent” case law on the
issue of married women’s legal name requirements and speculating that “requirements compelling
women to adopt their husbands’ surnames . . . will raise serious constitutional questions and will be
subject to careful scrutiny by the courts”).
50. See id. at 890 (noting that several cases, in dicta, state that a woman automatically assumes
her husband’s name upon marriage).
51. See, e.g., DAVID MOATS, CIVIL WARS: A BATTLE FOR GAY MARRIAGE 31 (2004) (“The [Vermont
Supreme Court’s] frequent reference to the nation’s landmark civil rights cases made clear the issue
of marriage for gays and lesbians represented an important new chapter in the broader movement for
civil
rights
in
America.”);
THE
NEW
CIVIL
RIGHTS
MOVEMENT,
http://thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/ (last visited March 25, 2013) (labeling itself as “A Journal of
News & Opinion on Gay Rights & Marriage Equality”).
52. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5.
53. Jena McGregor, With Senate Wins for Elizabeth Warren and Others, a New Year of the Woman?,
WASH. POST. (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-1107/national/35506839_1_women-leaders-center-for-american-women-republican-deb-fischer. Note
that “new” references the original Year of the Woman in 1992, when a then-unprecedented seven
women were in the Senate. January 3, 1993: “Year of the Woman”, UNITED STATES SENATE HISTORICAL
MINUTES, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/year_of_the_woman.htm (last
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important principle in America that it shapes laws across all areas of life.
C. Time to Recenter?: The Intersection of Caretaking and Equality
Together, caretaking and equality are reshaping the frontiers of family law.
Feminist scholars have argued for the past four decades that a marriage-centric
family law system must be reformed because it is not compatible with the value
of equality if it leaves so many caregivers disadvantaged by their marital status.54
They argue that horizontal relationships (“relationships between generally able
adults, in which both persons are interdependent and perform caretaking tasks
for one another”)55 such as marriage are the wrong trigger for family law
protections. For example, feminsts point out that marriage-centric policies lead to
a constant need to tweak family laws in order to better promote equality goals.
There have been numerous attempts to fix gendered inequities at the termination
of a marriage by developing a variety of formulations for equitable division and
alimony.56 Alimony was first conceptualized as maintenance for a dependent
wife, then tweaked with an eye toward compensation, retribution, or
rehabilitation for dependent spouses. Changes in formulas and exceptions for
the equitable division of marital property prevent some type of inequity. Divorce
law has seen dramatic changes over the past fifty years, all in the name of
equality.57

visited March 25, 2013).
54. See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 135–36 (1989) (“[M]arriage
and the family, as currently practiced in our society, are unjust institutions. They constitute the pivot
of a societal system of gender that renders women vulnerable to dependency, exploitation, and
abuse.”); see also Laura T. Kessler, New Frontiers in Family Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF
LAW, supra note 35, at 226(“Earlier feminists questioned the marital family’s central place in our
country’s law and social policy and exposed the costs of this framework to women, children, and
other vulnerable people. As such, they helped us imagine sex, intimacy, care, and reproduction
outside marriage and the nuclear family.”). I should note here that Fineman is quite outspoken
against the use of “equality” as a goal for family law and explicitly prefers to focus on “dependency
and vulnerability” instead. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Grappling With Equality: One Feminist
Journey, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW, supra note 35, at 47, 51–52 (“[T]he family, as our
most gendered institution, was not susceptible to the imposition of a formal equality model.”).
Fineman suggests, however, that her theory of dependency and vulnerability is just substantive
equality in sheep’s clothing. See id. (“In 1991, I hoped we might fashion a more substantive or resultsensitive version of equality in the family context . . . . While I still believe in the justness of the
substantive equality outcome, my vocabulary and arguments are less focused on gender and more
inclusive of those whose family . . . is not valued in a formal equality regime. I now discuss need in
terms of dependency and vulnerability.”).
55. EICHNER, supra note 26 , at 71. The term horizontal relationship is typically used to describe
marriage and romantic relationships, but Eichner suggests the value of care should lead to state
recognition of a broad range of horizontal relationships that involve caretaking. Examples include
“two elderly sisters who live together and take care of one another, a nonmonogamous homosexual
couple, a commune of five adults who live together with their children, and a heterosexual married
couple.” Id. at 105.
56. See generally, MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 1–75 (1991) (arguing that application of “neutral” rules in the family law
context perpetuates unequal outcomes).
57. See generally KATZ, supra note 31, at 76–130 (reviewing the history of divorce law since the
1950s).
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Those same feminist scholars that advocate for caretaking and equality
propose re-centering the current family law system to better accommodate both
of these values. A better trigger for the entitlements of family law would be a
system based on vertical relationships.58 A vertical relationship is one based on
vulnerability or dependency, such as when one person cares for an ill parent or
young child.59 A vertical relationship-based family law system would maximize
protection and support for caretakers while minimizing discrimination based on
family structure, marital status, gender, and sexual orientation. Preglimony is an
example of one such protection triggered by a vertical relationship. A pregnant
woman is not only in need of care due to her enhanced vulnerability from the
pregnancy but also a caregiver to the fetus she carries. Motro’s proposal to
accommodate some of the vulnerabilities of pregnancy for unmarried women
would naturally fit into this re-centered family law system.
II. THE SITUATION FACING UNMARRIED PREGNANT WOMEN
About a third of all children born in the United States are born into
unmarried families.60 An unmarried woman who becomes pregnant is most
likely in her early twenties.61 Only fifteen percent of unwed mothers are under
eighteen at age of birth.62 Non-marital pregnancies are most likely to occur
between couples in ongoing or long-term relationships.63 Based on her financial
situation, an unmarried pregnant woman is likely to struggle with the economic
burden of pregnancy.64
58. Anne Bottomley & Simone Wong, Shared Households: A New Paradigm for Thinking about the
Reform of Domestic Property Relations, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY LAW 39, 51–52 (Alison
Diduck & Katherine O’Donovan, eds., 2006) (“A focus on caring takes us beyond sexual relationships
and raises the issue of protecting those who have become economically vulnerable through home
sharing and especially through the role of caring.”).
59. EICHNER, supra note 26, at 71 (“[O]ne person is dependent on the other to meet fundamental
needs for caretaking and human development. Although the parent-child relationship serves as the
paradigm of this type of connection, other relationships, including those between an adult child and
their aging parent, also fit into this category.”).
60. Leave No Family Behind: How Can We Reduce The Rising Number of American Families Living in
Poverty?: Hearing Before the J. Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. 67 (2008) [hereinafter Leave No Family Behind]
(statement of Robert Rector, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation) .
61. Id. at 73 ((statement of Robert Rector, Senior Research Fellow, Heritage Foundation).. Half
are cohabiting, another 25% are in a relationship. And nearly all of the unmarried fathers are
employed and earning enough more than the moms to help get above poverty level.
62. Id.
63. Only 12% of women getting an abortion reported that they had not been in a relationship
with the man with whom they conceived. RACHEL JONES, LAWRENCE B. FINER, & SUSHEELA SINGH,
GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, CHARACTERISTICS OF U.S. ABORTION PATIENTS, 2008 at 5(2010).
64. Women with income less than 200% of the poverty line account for 70% of unwanted
pregnancies, see Lawrence B. Finer & Mia R. Zolna, Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Incidence
and Disparities, 2006, 84 CONTRACEPTION 478, 481 tbl.1 (2011), and 60% of abortions, Lawrence B. Finer
et al., Reasons U.S. Women Have Abortions: Quantitative and Qualitative Perspectives, 37 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 110, 112 (2005). After birth, single mothers are likely to continue to face
economic hardship, including not having enough income to pay bills or utilities, having phone
service disconnected, hunger, eviction, utility shut-offs, homelessness and insufficient medical care.
Ariel Kalil & Rebecca M. Ryan, Mothers’ Economic Conditions and Sources of Support in Fragile Families,
20 FUTURE OF CHILD., no. 2, 2010, at 39, 41-42.
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Unfortunately, statistics on non-marital pregnancy are correlated with
statistics on abortion. Nearly three-fourths of women who choose to terminate a
pregnancy cite finances as a reason for the abortion.65 Both married and
unmarried pregnant women may feel it is irresponsible to go forward with a
pregnancy and instead choose to terminate it.66 However, pregnancies of
unmarried women are more frequently aborted than pregnancies of married
women.67 Regardless of one’s politics about the morality of abortion, most can
agree that the decision to terminate a pregnancy should never be due to a lack of
financial resources to care for or gestate the child.
Family law contributes to the financial issues that are correlated with
abortion. Inadequate child support laws leave unmarried pregnant women with
most of the financial burden of the pregnancy even though a policy goal of child
support is a child’s supported from both parents, regardless of marital status.68
Current child support laws promise a single mother reimbursement for some
pregnancy-related expenses after the child is born, but that reimbursement is not
a workable solution for many single mothers. A reimbursement scheme assumes
the unmarried woman has enough resources to front the costs of her pregnancy
in the first place.69 Further, only a small portion of total pregnancy-related costs
are eligible for reimbursement under child support systems, which still leaves a
majority of a pregnancy’s financial burden on the mother.70
The disproportionate financial burden placed on an unmarried pregnant
woman can be exacerbated by her employment situation. Only fifty-eight percent
of all employees are covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).71
Many pregnant women lose their jobs altogether.72 Even if an unmarried
pregnant woman is eligible for FMLA leave, her financial reality (low income
and lack of a second earner’s support) may make it impossible to take time off of

65. See Finer et al., supra note 64, at 113 tbl.2 & 117 (“[O]ur data suggest that after carefully
assessing their individual situations, women base their decisions largely on their ability to maintain
economic stability and to care for the children they already have.”). On average, cohabiting and
single mothers earn just $11,000 per year compared to $26,000 for married mothers working the same
time. Kalil & Ryan, supra note 64, at 42.
66. Id. at 117 (“The concept of responsibility is inseparable from the theme of limited resources;
given their present circumstances, respondents considered their decision to have an abortion the
most responsible action.”).
67. Finer & Zolna, supra note 64, at 482.
68. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 651.
69. See Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 931–32 (noting that “pregnancy-related liability attaches
only after paternity has been established” meaning that the woman must bear all of the costs upfront
and wait for reimbursement).
70. Lost wages, birthing classes, prenatal care, counseling, maternity clothes and other expenses
not directly related to medical aspects of the pregnancy or delivery have all been rejected by courts as
unreasonable expenses for reimbursement. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 652–53 nn.16 & 18–20.
71. DAVID CANTOR, ET AL., WAGE & HOUR DIV., DEP’T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF
FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS, 2000 update at 3-2 (2001), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/chapter3.pdf.
72. See Dina Bakst, Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A25, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-job.html?_r=0
(providing examples of pregnant women terminated for requesting minor accommodations such as
more frequent bathroom breaks to maintain healthy pregnancies).
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work without pay.73
In short, an unmarried woman typically faces an uphill battle when it comes
to providing for herself during a pregnancy. Most economic protections for
pregnant women are insufficient because only the born child’s needs are
considered. An unmarried pregnant woman who needs more financial support
during the pregnancy must rely on the father’s goodwill or sense of moral
obligation to her or the unborn child; she is not legally entitled to pregnancy
support payments. A method to evenly divide the costs of a pregnancy is
important to ensure that unmarried pregnant women are not unfairly
disadvantaged by their marital status. Importantly, as the number of married
families dwindles, the potential benefits of preglimony become more
widespread.
III. PREGLIMONY, PATERNITY TESTING, AND FATHER-CHILD BONDING
Preglimony’s benefits extend beyond helping the mother through requiring
an unmarried father-to-be to keep up his share of the financial obligations of
pregnancy. Not only might the men benefit, but the children also stand to benefit
from the increased likelihood of a positive, long-term, father-child relationship.74
Recently, an unmarried pregnant woman in Seattle had trouble encouraging
either of two potential dads to help her during her pregnancy.75 Neither man was
willing to invest his time, money, or emotions without confirmation that he was
the genetic father.76 After a prenatal paternity test established one of the men as
the father, he attended the delivery and supported the child.77
Another woman had a brief sexual encounter with a friend shortly after
breaking up with a boyfriend.78 When she found herself pregnant, she did not
know which man was the father. After the prenatal paternity test confirmed that
her friend was the father, they were able to agree to child support before the
baby was even born.79 He remains connected and continues to send gifts and
child support to the now two-year-old daughter, even though the mother has

73. Melissa Brown, The “State” of Paid Family Leave: Insights from the 2006 and 2007 Legislative
Sessions, in INNOVATIONS IN CHILD AND FAMILY POLICY: MULTIDISCIPLINARY RESEARCH AND
PERSPECTIVES ON STRENGTHENING CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES 191, 193 (Emily M. Douglas, ed.,
2010) (“[M]any of those who qualify for FMLA cannot utilize it, despite having a need to, because
they cannot afford the loss of income that would result.”).
74. See Robert I. Lerman, Capabilities and Contributions of Unwed Fathers, 20 FUTURE OF CHILD.,
no.2,2010,, at 76–77 (highlighting a number of studies that have established a relationship between
strong child support enforcement policies and increased engagement from fathers). But see id. at 77
(noting one study that suggests child support enforcement does not increase total financial support
because any gains in formal support payments are offset by reduced informal support payments).
75. Andrew Pollack, Before Birth, Dad’s ID, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/20/health/paternity-blood-tests-that-work-early-in-apregnancy.html?pagewanted=all.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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since married another man.80
The ability to test for paternity before birth has been available for years, but
previous procedures were expensive, inaccurate, and risky.81 Collection of
amniotic fluid or chorionic villi from the womb could injure the fetus, induce
labor, or cause a miscarriage.82 A new, noninvasive method of genetic testing
uses fragments of the fetus’s DNA present in the mother’s blood and provides a
safe way to determine paternity as early as eight weeks after conception.83 For
women who need pregnancy support, this new test makes preglimony more
feasible because paternity can be reliably and safely established much earlier
than ever before. 84
Establishing paternal engagement before the birth of a child is ideal,
according to Maura Corrigan, former chief justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court and current director of the state’s Department of Human Services. The
children of involved fathers benefit from improved self-esteem and fewer
behavioral or academic difficulties compared to children who miss out on the
opportunity to develop a relationship with their father.85 Based on her experience
overseeing Michigan’s child support enforcement system, Corrigan believes that
encouraging men to establish a relationship with their child as early as possible
increases the likelihood that they will stay involved.86 She also notes that if a
child support “tab” gets too large before a father has the opportunity to connect
with his child, he might remain disconnected and shirk paternal
responsibilities.87
Judge Corrigan may be on to something. One group of social science
researchers are attempting to figure out why some men thrive as fathers despite
the fact that they seemed unlikely to build strong relationships with their

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Amniocentesis, AMERICAN PREGNANCY ASSOCIATION, http://www.american
pregnancy.org/prenataltesting/amniocentesis.html (last visited March 26, 2013) (stating that
miscarriage is the primary risk related to amniocentesis, ranging from 1 in 400 to 1 in 200); Chorionic
Villus
Sampling:
CVS,
AMERICAN
PREGNANCY
ASSOCIATION,
http://www.american
pregnancy.org/prenataltesting/cvs.html (last visited March 26, 2013) (“Miscarriage is the primary
risk related to CVS occurring 1 out of every 100 procedures.”).
83. Pollack, supra note 75.
84. There are concerns about misuse of a paternity test in relation to abortion. For example,
some worry that a woman with several sexual partners may choose to terminate a pregnancy if
paternity was linked to a non-preferred father.. But supporters of the new test respond that a woman
could still order an invasive test under the old technology, and that such situations are too rare to
justify blocking access to the new test. Id.
85. Solangel Maldonado, Recidivism and Paternal Engagement, 40 FAMILY L.Q. 191, 194 (2006).
86. See Maura D. Corrigan, A Formula for Fool’s Gold: The Illustrative Child Support Formula in
Chapter 3 of the ALI’s Principles, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 409, 419 (Robin Fretwell Wilson, ed.,
2006) (“[W]e should take steps that will encourage all parents to ‘buy in’ to the process and their
children’s futures.”).
87. Id. (“Barring a lottery win or pro sports contract, the long-absent father almost certainly will
not have the ability to pay the accrued arrearage . . . . giv[ing] him a strong incentive to hide within a
large city or flee to another state. . . . until it is too late for normal father-child bonding.”).
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children.88 The researchers have been tracking men who do better than expected
as fathers and explore what factors may have contributed to their paternal
success. One of those “better than expected” fathers, named Carl, is their
exemplar.89 Carl was a high-school dropout with a diagnosed conduct disorder
and substance abuse problems when he found out he was going to be a father.90
When the researchers interviewed him two years after the birth of his first child,
they were surprised to learn that Carl was very involved and working two jobs
to take care of his two kids.91 Carl said that he used to spend his money on
“flashy clothes . . . going to shows, partying” but that he gave that lifestyle up to
spend more time with his children.92 Describing himself as a “very good” father,
Carl explained that he forced himself to mature because he “can’t live without”
his kids.93
The researchers studying Carl and eighteen other high-risk fathers posit that
one important factor in making a successful transition to fatherhood is having a
supportive co-parent—one that communicates with the father and is open to his
participation.94 Interestingly, the romantic success of a couple was not necessarily
a predictor of the father’s success or failure as a co-parent.95 And some betterthan-expected participants described the experience of becoming a father as
transformative in itself.96
Preglimony might have a strong impact on the type of men who become
“better-than-expected” fathers because the fatherhood experience could “begin”
even earlier. Additional research shows that once men become engaged with
their child, they remain engaged.97 One respondent who found herself single and
pregnant by a former boyfriend was surprised to discover how involved the

88.

Paul Florsheim & Le Q. Ngu, Fatherhood as a Transformative Process, in FRAGILE FAMILIES AND
211, 213–14 (Lori Kowaleski-Jones & Nicholas H. Wolfinger, eds., 2006).
89. See id. at 213–15 (noting that Carl initially “did not seem like a good bet for a positive
outcome” based on his background and circumstances).
90. Id. at 213–14.
91. Id. at 214. Statistics show that unmarried men do tend to increase earnings after becoming
fathers—22% gain in income within the first year of the child’s birth and a total 30% gain within three
years. Lerman, supra note 74, at 63, 67. Unmarried fathers do this through a combination of small
hourly wage gains and larger increased in total hours worked, moving from 46 weeks of full-time
work to 50 weeks of full-time work within five years. Id.
92. Paul Florsheim & Le Q. Ngu, Fatherhood as a Transformative Process, in FRAGILE FAMILIES AND
THE MARRIAGE AGENDA, supra note 88,. at 214–15 (describing his old lifestyle and saying, “I can’t do
that now, I got kids so I got to be there with them . . .”).
93. See id. at 214 (“Ain’t a time when I ain’t around them. When I wake up, they see my face,
when they go to sleep, they see my face. So, as long as they see my face then and there, I’m alright.
It’s like they are a very special part of me and it’s just something I can’t live without.”).
94. Id. at 215, 225–29.
95. Id. at 229 (noting that relationship quality matters more than presence or lack of marriage in
terms of co-parenting).
96. Id. at 223.
97. Lerman, supra note 74, at 75 (“Unwed fathers who participated at the time of the birth in
parenting and providing financial support were more likely to remain involved with their
children.”). This is especially true for black fathers, who are more likely than both white and latino
fathers to maintain relationships with their children, even if the father has no ongoing relationship
with the mother. Id.
THE MARRIAGE AGENDA
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father became over the years.98 Although he had initially expressed his intent to
avoid a relationship with the child-to-be, the respondent stated that after the
birth he “fell in love” with the child to the point where he now asks for daily
reports about their son.99 Preglimony may increase the likelihood of father-child
bonding by giving unmarried men the transformative experience of fatherhood
early enough in the pregnancy that they feel permanently connected to the child.
Men stand to gain from meaningful relationships that they may have otherwise
avoided, women benefit from a more evenly divided financial burden of the
pregnancy, and any resulting children benefit from the increased opportunity for
positive relationships with both parents.
IV. MOTRO’S PROPOSAL AND GOALS
“Preglimony.” Shari Motro coined this term to describe her proposed
method for pregnancy support. It sounds familiar because this neologism is a
phonetic and conceptual derivative of the much more well-known concept of
alimony.100 Unsurprisingly, Motro models her support for preglimony on the
justifications for alimony. She aims for preglimony to change norms so that
unmarried partners who conceive are socially, morally, and legally expected to
share the burdens of pregnancy that currently fall disproportionately on the
women in these relationships. But Motro’s argument breaks down when she
suggests creating a pregnancy-support tax deduction to reward pregnancy
support payments and thus encourage preglimony rather than mandate it.
A. Motro’s Justifications for Preglimony
Motro parallels her justifications for preglimony with four of the rationales
that support alimony: reasonable reliance, rehabilitation, equitable distribution,
and compensation. Alimony based on reasonable reliance entitles a dependent
spouse to financial support for reasonably relying on a broken marital promise to
share economic resources for life. Similarly, Motro suggests that sex can be
viewed as an implied “promise” whereby each partner accepts shared
responsibility if a pregnancy results. Unless the partners clearly agreed to a “no
strings attached” relationship, preglimony holds partners to their promise.101
Alimony from a rehabilitation perspective is provided to a dependent
spouse who needs support until he or she is economically rehabilitated. The
support payments are a temporary measure until the spouse becomes selfsupporting, such as after completion of an academic or vocational training
program and securing full-time employment. Viewing preglimony through the
lens of rehabilitation, Motro emphasizes that preglimony is temporary assistance
to help a woman through one of the most vulnerable and dependent periods of

98. ROSANNA HERTZ, SINGLE BY CHANCE, MOTHERS BY CHOICE: HOW WOMEN ARE CHOOSING
PARENTHOOD WITHOUT MARRIAGE AND CREATING THE NEW AMERICAN FAMILY 81–82 (2006).
99. Id.
100. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 648.
101. See id. at 648–50, 658, and 668 (emphasizing that the “lovers-as-strangers” rule is only
appropriate when they had previously agreed to no-strings-attached sex).
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her life.102 By sharing the financial cost of a pregnancy between the partners,
preglimony would help an unmarried woman get back on her feet more quickly
after a pregnancy.
The third justification for alimony is that it prevents financial losses from
being unequally distributed between the spouses. Alimony redistributes losses
from the divorce so that each spouse carries an equal portion of the burden. By
the same token, preglimony prevents the financial costs of a pregnancy from
being unequally distributed by evenly sharing those costs between the
partners.103
Alimony provided from a compensation perspective acknowledges one
spouse’s sacrificed career opportunities or noneconomic contributions to the
family. Those lost opportunities may never be recoverable, so the other spouse is
expected to pay alimony as restitution. Similarly, preglimony resembles
compensatory alimony in that it compensates unmarried women for lost wages,
career delays, and other nonmonetary contributions to the pregnancy.104 By
showing how closely the justifications for preglimony track the justifications for
alimony, Motro demonstrates why she believes preglimony is better
characterized as an alimony framework than a child support framework.
A. Motro’s Goals
Motro clearly states her belief that preglimony should be characterized as an
obligation to the woman, not to the fetus.105 She advocates against a childsupport model for three reasons.106 First, Motro demonstrates that current child
support reimbursements for pregnancy-related expenses are insufficient and
unfair. Fathers are only expected to pay for expenses that are reasonable,
necessary, customary, and directly linked to the child—typically doctor visits
and the costs of delivery. Any other unavoidable costs of pregnancy—lost wages,
childbirth classes, maternity clothes—are not included on the list of reimbursable
expenses.
Even if preglimony perfectly divided the financial costs of pregnancy, it is
still an imperfect solution. As the physical carrier of the fetus, a woman carries
all of the physical costs of pregnancy such as sickness, fatigue, discomfort and
pain, a risk of medical complications, and healing after the birth or cesarean.
Moreover, as the evidence of her pregnancy expands, an unmarried pregnant
woman may feel stigmatized and experience changes to her social or professional
identity.107 It is inherently unfair if two partners are equally responsible for

102. See id. at 670 (“Preglimony will also ensure that a pregnant woman who is temporarily
unable to provide for herself will be taken care of during a transitional period.”).
103. Id.
104. See id. at 669–70 (analogizing “[a] man’s obligation towards his pregnant lover . . . to the
support obligations of a breadwinner towards a dependent spouse”).
105. Id. at 651–58 (reviewing how current child support laws provide insufficient support to
unmarried pregnant women).
106. Id. at 659 (calling the child-support model “unfair, unwise, and untrue to human
experience”).
107. Dear Prudence received a question from a mother concerned that her daughter would “get
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conception, but only one faces the burdens of the pregnancy. Women carry all of
the physical burdens by operation of nature and most of the economic costs by
operation of law.108
Additionally, Motro hopes preglimony will incentivize more responsible
behavior among sexually-active men. Motro argues that holding men financially
responsible for any resulting pregnancy, whether terminated or not, will raise the
stakes enough to make them think twice about “what happens in the
bedroom.”109 She points out that stronger child support enforcement correlates
with changes to male sexual decision making, specifically increased
contraception use and fewer sexual partners.110“
Lastly, Motro argues that a lovers-as-strangers paradigm for non-marital
conception is the wrong legal default because it represents only a small percent
of pregnancies outside of marriage:
Unmarried partners who conceive respond to pregnancy in a
range of different ways. Some get married. Others face
pregnancy and its repercussions—whether it ends in abortion,
miscarriage, or childbirth—together without marrying. A third
group views conception as the woman’s private affair. The law
effectively treats all sexual partners who are not married as
falling into the third category.111
According to Motro, preglimony would establish a more realistic default, one
which recognizes that a non-marital conception has, at the very least,
“existentially bound” the couple during gestation.112 If the law acknowledges
that marriage is not a realistic or attractive solution for every couple who
conceives,113 it must create new legal statuses, with non-marital conception as

the impression that single motherhood is acceptable” because the daughter’s fourth grade teacher
was unmarried and pregnant. The mother had questioned the teacher about her intent to keep the
baby, to which the teacher responded that her choice and marital status was a private matter, and the
mother wanted to know if she should take the issue to the principal. Dear Prudence’s response was
that the mother’s question was “so far over the line” that she might as well have “inquire[d] as to her
favorite sexual position.” Emily Yoffe, My Daughter’s Teacher is Unwed and Knocked Up, SLATE (Feb.
27, 2012, 3:05 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/life/dear_prudence/2012/02/knocked_up_single_
teacher_will_she_corrupt_my_daughter_.html.
108. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 653–56 (“[W]hen the man is not forthcoming and the pregnancy
is complicated (both physically and in its impact on a woman’s work life), the law leaves a single
pregnant woman to shoulder most of the burdens alone.”).
109. Id. at 656–57; see also discussion, infra, Part VI.A. (exploring implications of the preglimonyas-support-for-the-woman framework in terms of abortion rights of men).
110. Id. at 656.
111. Id. at 697; see also Motro, supra note 1 (“A man and a woman who conceive are intimately
connected. They are not spouses, and they may not even continue to be lovers, but they are not
strangers either.”).
112. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 689 (“Conception is a marriage of sorts. It is the union of two
individuals’ bodies to create a third potential life. While this potential life is in gestation . . . a man
who supports the woman carrying it is different from a man supporting a stranger, a friend, or a
sister. He is supporting a person—the woman—who is bearing his own flesh, including if the woman
ultimately terminates the pregnancy. During the weeks or months of the pregnancy, man and woman
are existentially bound.”).
113. See HARRINGTON, supra note 38, at 88–89 (noting a trend among single women who chose
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just one of many diverse family types. Motro argues that this is a better legal
default because it acknowledges the breadth of human relationships leading to
conception and the unique challenges faced by unmarried pregnant couples.114
B. Motro’s Tax Incentive Plan
Instead of mandating preglimony, Motro would institute a tax deduction
that encourages pregnancy support payments by deducting the total amount of
support payments from the payor’s income.115 Under current laws, economic
support provided to an unmarried pregnant woman is taxed to the payor.
Individuals are prohibited from shifting their income to others because of
concerns that such shifts could allow the income to be taxed in a lower bracket.116
The income-shifting prohibition lifts for married couples, who receive a tax
benefit when one spouse financially supports the other spouse through
attribution of the total marital income as evenly divided between the two.117 A
single individual who earns $100,000 has a higher tax burden than two
individuals who each earn $50,000. But a married couple in which one spouse
earns $100,000 and the other earns nothing is taxed as if they had each earned
$50,000, lowering their combined tax burden below what it would have been as
individuals.118 As a result, because of the couple’s filing status pregnancy
support in the context of a marriage has an inherent tax benefit that is
unmatched for unmarried couples because of the couple’s filing status.119
Without a deduction, an unmarried man who pays preglimony will be
taxed as if the money he gives to the woman was still his income. Characterizing
preglimony as “child support” or as a “gift” to the woman for tax purposes will
not change this outcome for the payor, although it would prevent the recipient
from also paying a tax as if the payment were her income.120 Motro notes that the
worst-case tax treatment scenario would be if pregnancy support payments
could not be characterized as either gifts or child support and were thus taxable
to both parties, similar to how payments to a housekeeper are taxed.121
Looking at the language of the tax code, it is not clear how preglimony
would be characterized for tax purposes absent an express pregnancy support
deduction. Payments made out of “the constraining force of any moral . . . duty”

not to marry the fathers of their children because the men were undependable, irresponsible, or
unwilling to fully commit to marriage—in short, that the women had rejected traditional
assumptions that a mother’s role was to tolerate her husband’s apathy to family matters). See also
discussion, supra, Part ___ (discussing arbitrariness of marriage as the trigger for family law
entitlements).
114. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 657–58 (“[U]sing the lovers-as-strangers paradigm as the baseline
governing all nonmarital conceptions flies in the face of most people’s reality.”).
115. Id. at 672–73.
116. Id. at 676–78.
117. Id. at 676.
118. Id. at 676 n.112.
119. See MORSE, supra note 30, at 96 (noting that married fathers contribute about $30,000 per
year on average to their children and noncustodial fathers contribute about $3,000 per year).
120. See Preglimony, supra note 1, at 678–82.
121. Id. at 680–81.
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are not considered gifts for tax purposes, suggesting that preglimony paid out of
a man’s sense of moral obligation to the woman with whom he conceived may
very well not be considered a gift.122 In contrast, courts have classified monetary
transfers between sexual partners as gifts in the past, which would keep the
recipient from being taxed on the support payment.123 Motro’s proposal
simplifies these issues and treats preglimony as a deduction similar to
alimony.124 The payor would be permitted to deduct the payments and the
recipient would include the payments as income.125 Although this means a
woman could have a higher tax burden, she benefits overall by receiving more
total economic support.
Motro believes that the opportunity to deduct preglimony payments will
incentivize men to provide pregnancy support. Over time she thinks that enough
men will be incentivized to pay preglimony that social norms will change
regarding each sex’s responsibility in a non-marital conception.126 According to
her, viewing the very word “preglimony” on tax forms will create a mental link
between “pregnancy [and] financial obligation in the minds of taxpayers.”127
Motro believes this link will create a norm in which pregnancy support becomes
“socially mandatory,” and that the new norm will influence sexual decisionmaking to ultimately reduce the number of unintended pregnancies.128
Interestingly, Motro refrains from suggesting preglimony be implemented
as a legal right or mandatory requirement. She states that her incentive plan
avoids the “thorny enforcement issues” that come with mandating pregnancy
support and sanctioning men for failing to comply with the new requirements.129
But as a result of her incentive plan, couples who already treat pregnancy as a
shared responsibility will benefit from tax incentives. Other men might decide to
make preglimony payments if the tax incentives were strong enough. The reality
that Motro brushes aside is that most of the men who would not have provided
support before the tax incentives were available would probably not provide
support after the plan was implemented either.130 A man must have enough
taxable income in order to make the deduction worthwhile. Even if he has
enough income, it takes a fairly high level of sophistication to understand the tax
system in a way that leads to deliberate behavior change ex ante.
122. See id. at 680 n.125 (citing to Bogardus v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937)).
123. Id. at 680.
124. Id. at 682–83.
125. See id.at 682 (“The remaining choice . . . is to move from the status quo . . . to an income
shifting option . . . .”).
126. See id. at 689 (“[T]he policy will encourage support for pregnant women. . . . [and] sham[e]
those who leave their pregnant lovers to fend for themselves.”)..
127. Id. at 689-90.
128. See id. at 691(“[T]he fear of such responsibility may incentivize men who do not want to
become fathers to be more vigilant about birth control.”).
129. See Preglimony, supra note 1, at 672 (suggesting a reward program for men who already
provide pregnancy support to “encourage[] cooperation rather than conflict”); see also id. at 650 (“I
also recognize that imposing a mandatory pregnancy-support obligation on unmarried men presents
both administrative and philosophical challenges . . . .”).
130. See id. at 673 (recognizing that her solution “provides no help to poor couples, equal-earner
couples . . . and most young couples”).
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Motro acknowledges that the only women who benefit from this scheme are
the ones who are already in relationships with “good” men: “[t]he solution I
offer . . . begins with relatively low-hanging fruit—high income men already
predisposed to contribute to their pregnant lovers’ welfare—pursuing a viable,
symbolically potent first step towards breaking the silence on this issue.”131 This
solution seems to conflict with her characterization of the situation necessitating
preglimony in the first place. Motro cited a man’s lack of legal obligation to a
woman with whom he conceives as problematic because it leaves the woman
with no legally enforceable entitlement should the father refuse to support her
during the pregnancy.132 But her proposed solution is all carrot and no stick,
leaving unmarried pregnant women in nearly the exact same situation she seeks
to change. The benefits of preglimony would remain out of reach for a pregnant
woman unable to convince her partner to take advantage of the tax deduction.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF PREGLIMONY AS AN ALIMONY MODEL
Unmarried fathers will still benefit from preglimony under this framework
because they still have an extended opportunity to demonstrate commitment to
their child, and unmarried pregnant women will still benefit from the accelerated
economic support rather than having to wait until after the birth to be
reimbursed for pregnancy-related expenses.133
A. Questions about Preglimony and Abortion
Motro notes that the most frequently and vehemently debated implications
of her proposal regard abortion.134 None of the abortion-related criticisms of
preglimony are new arguments; the same questions about abortion have already
been asked and answered in the context of conception within marriage. For
example, father’s rights groups and pro-life advocates fear that a man could be
required to pay to terminate a pregnancy against his will. This fear is not
completely unprecedented—medically-indicated abortions have been upheld as
reasonable and reimbursable expenses.135
However, the same safeguards protecting a married woman who chooses to
abort without the consent or notification of her husband would still be in place
for an unmarried woman who chooses to abort without consent or notification of
her partner.136 Despite the social goal of encouraging men and women to make

131. Id.
132. See id. at 649–50 (noting that the status quo “implicitly endorses a view of lovers as legal
strangers”)..
133. See discussion, supra, Parts II and III.
134. Motro, supra note 1 (“The most frequent objection I hear to this idea is . . . over abortion.”).
135. C. v. L., 305 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969) (“It appears clear to us that the costs of a
therapeutic abortion can be included within the statutory definition of ‘such reasonable expenses in
connection with her pregnancy as the court in its discretion may deem proper.’ . . . [W]e see no reason
why such expenses should be treated in a fashion different from the expenses of a stillbirth.”)(internal
citations omitted).
136. See Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 937 (“[T]he law in all fifty states recognizes that a wife’s
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choices regarding abortion together and openly, a married woman’s preference
to end the pregnancy over the objection of her husband gets the slightest weight
over a man’s because she is the one who carries and incubates the child.137 There
is no reason to think that an unmarried man would have or should have more
influence over a woman’s decision to keep or terminate their pregnancy than a
married man. Just as married couples may discuss the decision to keep or end a
pregnancy, unmarried couples can engage in those conversations, but the choice
ultimately rests with the woman.138
A more positive gloss on preglimony’s abortion implications is that
unmarried fathers might benefit by being able to participate in decisions of
which they may have not otherwise been aware, which gives them an
opportunity to share their feelings and preferences before the woman decides.139
Another potential benefit of preglimony is that it may lead to fewer
abortions. Abortion rates are documented as declining as child support
enforcement improves.140 Women who expect future economic support are more
likely to continue with the pregnancy, which makes sense given the high
percentage (nearly seventy-five percent) of women who terminate pregnancies
for financial reasons.141 Although this effect was noted in relation to child
support enforcement, Motro notes that preglimony and child support are
sufficiently similar that it would be reasonable to expect a further decrease in
abortion rates if preglimony was implemented and enforced.142 Indeed, the
immediacy of pregnancy support may weigh more heavily in a woman’s
decision to keep the pregnancy than the distant promise of child support if a
pregnancy is carried to term.
B. Marital Status Equality
Preglimony will promote equality by providing more economic support for
unmarried pregnant women. Pro-marriage advocates criticize preglimony as
unnecessary because “[t]here is already a system where the man has paid for the
right to choose does not cancel her spouse’s duty of mutual support. . . . A similar logic applies in the
nonmarital context.”).
137. See id. at 946–47 (“[W]hen the wife and the husband disagree on this decision, the view of
only one of the two marriage partners can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears
the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the
two, the balance weighs in her favor.”) (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. V. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 71 (1976)).
138. Motro notes a concern of domestic violence or pressure as a reason to keep men out of the
abortion decision. There is a concern that men may pressure women to have an abortion, but she
asserts that the speculative worry that this would happen as a result of preglimony is no reason to deny
all other women the economic support they need during pregnancy. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 671.
A Guttmacher Institute study suggests that Motro is correct: less than 1% of women who had an
abortion stated that their parents’ or partners’ influence was the most important reason they chose to
terminate the pregnancy. Finer et al., supra note 64, at 118.
139. See Preglimony, supra note 1, at 671 (“[O]nce men have to pay they will be brought into the
conversation and have an opportunity to share their feelings and preferences.”).
140. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 671 & n.92.
141. See discussion supra, Part II.
142. Preglimony, supra note 1, at 671 & n.92.
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pregnancy for decades. It is called marriage.”143 Motro and other family law
scholars have pointed out, however, that the institution of marriage has a long
history of gendered assumptions and is an arbitrary determinate of social and
governmental benefits.144 In contrast, the state of pregnancy is a binary option—
conception either occurred or it did not—and it creates an ineradicable
connection between two people. In other words, marriage is defined by culture,
whereas pregnancy is defined by nature. Yet in a culture that purports to value
equality, pregnancy outside of marriage is not celebrated, protected, or
supported to the same extent as pregnancy within marriage.145
Those who share the value of caretaking will agree that a pregnant woman
needs support due to her increased vulnerability during the pregnancy. The
value of equality suggests that the man with whom she conceived, as an equal
contributor to the pregnancy, should offer that support regardless of the status of
the couple’s relationship. Preglimony promotes equality goals by formalizing a
legal obligation between sexual partners who have conceived that is independent
of marital or relationship status. The new legal obligation redistributes the cost of
a pregnancy to reflect each partner’s equal assumption of risk and contribution
to the pregnancy.146
C. Gender Equality
Although some men believe preglimony is unfair to them,147 preglimony’s
redistribution of responsibility actually has the potential to benefit men seeking
more parental time with their offspring.148 In the nineteenth century wives and
children were legally considered to be the property of men, which gave fathers
uncontested decision making about child custody.149 Over time, courts reversed

143. Javert, Comment to Law Professor Proposes “Preglimony”, THE SPEARHEAD (July 9, 2012, 7:22
PM), http://www.the-spearhead.com/2012/07/09/law-professor-proposes-preglimony/; see also
Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 995 (Mass. 2003) (Cordy, J., dissenting) (“[A]n
orderly society requires some mechanism for coping with the fact that sexual intercourse commonly
results in pregnancy and childbirth. The institution of marriage is that mechanism.”)
144. See discussion supra Part II.C; see also EICHNER, supra note 26, at 93 (“[T]he fact of the matter
is that marriage is a social institution that is subject to societal control.”); OKIN, supra note 54, at 111
(“[T]he family is undeniably political because it is the place where we become our gendered selves . . .
the division of labor within the gender-structured family raises both practical and psychological
barriers against women in all the other spheres of life.”).
145. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Marriage, Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 2004
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 229 (2004) (claiming that it is easier to regulate marriage because it is more
stable than other relationships and informal unions).
146. See Price of Pleasure, supra note 1, at 919 (“This relational default would come with certain
obligations . . . a woman would be expected to communicate the fact of a pregnancy to the man with
whom she conceived, and a man would be required to help support her during pregnancy and
recovery.”).
147. See Franklin, supra note 4, (“Now Motro . . . want[s] to add a huge new layer to that current
shameful inequality [between mothers and fathers] while giving nothing to fathers in return.”)
148. See id. (claiming that he would agree to pay preglimony in exchange for a presumption of
equal parenting time but would refuse to pay without an increase in parental rights); see also JULIA
LUYSTER, A FATHER’S RIGHT TO CUSTODY 225 (2009) (assuring fathers who feel like their rights “are
not equally honored by the court” by affirming that this is “not an unreasonable feeling”).
149. Ayanna, supra note18, at 9–10.
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that trend and acknowledged the maternal role in caretaking for children,
leading to a presumption that children of “tender years” (usually under age
seven) could only be cared for properly by their mothers.150
The tender years presumption persisted until the 1970s, when it was
replaced by ostensibly gender-neutral schemes such as the “best interest of the
child” standard or the joint custody presumption in child custody decisions.151
However, despite the insertion of the gender neutral language there is great
evidence that unconscious bias against fathers as caregivers continues to impact
custody decisions: “[f]amily law, in significant ways, continues to frame fathers
as breadwinners, emphasizing the importance of their economic role but not
their care role.”152 A still widely-held belief that the maternal bond is unique and
irreplaceable works to advantage women over men in custody decisions.
Preventing fathers from caring for their children can have a negative effect
on the father’s well-being.153 One way for fathers to demonstrate their
commitment to caretaking is to accept parental duties from the start of a
pregnancy as mothers have to do. A pregnant woman does not have the luxury
of waiting until birth or later to decide whether she will opt-in as a mother. Even
if she does not choose to raise the child, once conception occurs a woman who
chooses to carry the pregnancy to term must already begin her parenting duties.
Before a child is even born, she has amassed evidence demonstrating her
connection to the child, while the father may not even be aware of the pregnancy.
In this way, biology works against an unmarried father who may want full or
shared custody of his child.
A recent North Carolina case illustrates how difficult it can be for an
unmarried father to demonstrate sufficient commitment to the child to veto an
adoption.154 Once the father learned of the pregnancy, he took a number of steps
in preparation for the child. He left college and moved to be closer to the mother,
started working, bought a larger vehicle in anticipation of transporting the child,
discussed potential names with the mother, and offered to take the baby if she
did not want it.155 Later in the pregnancy, the mother lied and told him she

150. JOCELYN ELISE CROWLEY, DEFIANT DADS: FATHERS’ RIGHTS ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA 28–29
(2008) (“Society viewed the mother as holding a special place in the family, and in particular as the
parent who ‘specialized in addressing the needs of children of tender years’[.]”).
151. Id. at 29–30.
152. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 1047, 1071 (2012); see also Edward Greer, Custodial Relocation and Gender Warfare: Thinking
About Section 2.17 of the ALI PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 235,
244–45 (2011) (“[T]he dominant family law discourse continues to conceptualize [child custody]
conflicts as though current American families were basically the same as those of the 1950s. It treats
the shift in the nature of fathering as something that might occur in the indefinite future, and not as a
contemporaneous fait accompli. This matters because the dominant discourse among family law
professors . . . infuses the behavior of our nation’s domestic relations courts.”).
153. Kelli K. Garcia, The Gender Bind: Men as Inauthentic Caregivers, 20 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y
1, 36–37 (describing the stress experienced by fathers whose actual level of childcare involvement is
less than their ideal level of involvement).
154. A Child’s Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006).
155. Id. at 673–77.
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miscarried.156 Doubting her claims, the father called social services to see if he
might be the biological father of a baby abandoned at a local hospital the same
weekend the mother claimed she had a miscarriage.157 He also contacted her
doctor but was turned away due to confidentiality concerns.158
Despite all of these efforts, the court determined that termination of his
parental rights was appropriate because he had failed to satisfy strict statutory
elements demonstrating his assumption of parental responsibilities.159 In the
interest of establishing stable parentage, even egregiously thwarted fathers have
no entitlement to veto adoptions of their biological children in North Carolina.160
Preglimony helps these fathers in two ways. First, it gives women an
incentive to notify potential fathers as early in the pregnancy as possible to
receive economic support. This is a significant step up from the wait-and-see
type of solution offered by putative father registries.161 Second, unmarried men
will have the opportunity to assume parenting responsibilities long before the
child is born, which could affect their receipt of more parenting time by leveling
the playing field between unmarried fathers and mothers in custody or adoption
disputes.
Thus, a support-for-the-woman framework will promote gender equality
for both men and women. This model of preglimony emphasizes the equal
assumption of risk between unmarried sexual partners and seeks to equalize the
costs of pregnancy. Equalization benefits unmarried pregnant women through
shared economic resources, and it benefits unmarried fathers by solidifying their
parental rights through the sharing of pre-birth responsibilities.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF PREGLIMONY AS A CHILD SUPPORT MODEL
Under a support-for-the-child framework, preglimony’s normative goals of
gender equality and shared responsibility disappear because the focus of
preglimony rests entirely on contributing to the healthy development of a child.
But unmarried pregnant women will not receive as much of an economic benefit
under this framework because many costs of a pregnancy, such as maternity

156. Id. at 675.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 678 (“Despite the fact that respondent may have acted consistently with
acknowledging his paternity, the statute is clear in its requirements . . . and the trial court made no
findings that respondent, prior to the filing of the termination petition, a) established paternity
judicially, b) legitimated the juvenile either through judicial process or c) marriage to the mother, or
d) provided the biological mother with substantial financial support or consistent care.”)
160. See generally, In re Adoption of Byrd, 552 S.E.2d 142 (N.C. 2001) (“While respondent did
acknowledge his paternity in accordance with the statute, he failed to provide tangible support to
mother and child within his financial means . . . . All requirements of the statute must be met in order
for a father to require his consent to an adoption. While respondent demonstrated remarkable resolve
and a commendable sense of responsibility and concern for a seventeen-year-old father, he did not
meet his statutory burden in this case. . .”).
161. For a discussion on some of the problems of putative father registries, see generally Lisa M.
Simpson, Adoption Law: It May Take a Village to Raise a Child, But It Takes National Uniformity to Adopt
One, 3 PHOENIX L. REV 575 (2010).
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clothes, cannot be directly attributed to the needs of the fetus.162
Comparing the two alternatives, the full economic burden of pregnancy is
split under the woman-centered framework but only certain child-centric
expenses are divided under this child-centered framework—just as they are
under current child support systems. Unmarried pregnant women who, by
virtue of their sex, will always carry the full physical burden of pregnancy
continue shouldering an unequal portion of the financial burden as well. This
unequal sharing contradicts Motro’s stated goals for preglimony and also
violates family law principles of equality in general.
Establishing a man’s relationship with his child-in-utero can also facilitate
adoption decisions. Current adoption laws provide an opportunity to an
unmarried father to veto an adoption if he has demonstrated a desire to support
or connect with the child. A father who never had an opportunity to demonstrate
his connection to a child or put himself on a putative father registry may lose his
opportunity to block the adoption.163 Preglimony creates an incentive for
pregnant women in financial distress to connect with the father-to-be early in the
pregnancy, even if she plans to place the baby with an adoptive family after
birth. Without a preglimony scheme in place, the father may have never learned
of the pregnancy until after his paternal rights were nearly lost.164 If a woman
decided that she was unable to keep her baby, her partner’s support of the
pregnancy could evidence that he can take on full caretaking responsibilities.
Alternatively, a father-to-be’s lack of compliance with preglimony
requirements could be used as a clear signal that a father abandoned his parental
rights. A father’s failure to meet preglimony requirements could facilitate a
speedy adoption once the child was born, while still giving the father ample
opportunity throughout the length of the pregnancy to demonstrate his desire to
assume parental responsibilities. Either way, the child benefits when legal
parentage is established as quickly and as stably as possible. States do not want
to see a repeat of the debacles of the 1990s, when children that had been raised in
adoptive families for years were returned to their thwarted biological fathers.165
The concept of preglimony as support for the child may be less
controversial to the public because it eliminates the issue of whether a man
would have to pay to terminate a pregnancy against his will. If there is no fetus,
then he has no obligation to ensure it develops into a healthy child. This
controversy arises even though the same abortion-related criticisms have already

162. See id.
163. NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD 122 (2000) (“[F]athers are required to be
attentive to the mother during her pregnancy or diligent once the child is born if they wish to assert
their paternity. For fathers this can mean that, unless they remain in an ongoing relationship with the
mother or are informed of the pregnancy, the law gives them very limited time to learn of, or to be
notified of, the existence of their child before their rights are terminated.”).
164. See discussion, supra, Part V.C. (reviewing the harsh bright-line rule for unmarried fathers to
establish parental rights in North Carolina).
165. See Laura Oren, Thwarted Fathers or Pop-Up Pops?: How to Determine When Putative Fathers
Can Block the Adoption of Their Newborn Children, 40 FAM. L.Q. 153, 163-67 (2007) (highlighting two
cases where children were returned to biological parents after long legal battles that received
significant media attention in the 1990s).
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been addressed in the context of marriage.166 It might be faster and easier to
convince states to augment current child support guidelines than to implement
what the public may see as a completely new and morally troubling scheme.
Motro needs to make a clear choice: is it more important to use preglimony to
promote her normative goals? Or is it more important to get unmarried pregnant
women more economic support as soon as possible?
CONCLUSION
Preglimony has the potential to benefit mothers, fathers, and children
through more stable finances during pregnancy, more efficient and accurate
custody and adoption decisions, and increased likelihood of father-child
bonding. The importance of these benefits and the fact that preglimony has the
potential to create positive outcomes with limited corresponding cost (because
financial costs are shifted but not created) only enhances the attractiveness of
Motro’s proposal. Whether framed as an obligation to the child or to the mother,
preglimony is likely on the horizon. Even when the current system does provide
support to unmarried pregnant women through child support reimbursement,
the checks are too little and they arrive too late to do much good for the child-tobe.
Characterizing preglimony as a father’s obligation to his potential child—an
extension of already established child support guidelines—might make it easier
to gather public support for its implementation even if the obligations are
mandatory. It has become relatively uncontroversial to require noncustodial
parents to provide for their children. But the potential loss in terms of upholding
equality principles makes a child-centered framework unappealing. A straight
application of the child support framework for preglimony would still force
unmarried women to carry the bulk of the financial cost of the pregnancy,
perpetuating both marital status discrimination and gender inequalities. In
contrast, the alimony framework, which emphasizes support for the pregnant
woman herself, responds to her particular financial needs due to pregnancy. The
alimony model thus better respects core family law principles of equality and
care, making it the more appropriate framework.
Motro is clear that she intends preglimony to be modeled after alimony.
However, in the face of the criticisms of the alimony framework she attempts to
temper this characterization by suggesting preglimony be implemented through
a tax incentive plan rather than mandated. This plan is insufficient because it
forces an unmarried pregnant woman to hope that the father is willing to make
preglimony payments rather than giving her legal entitlement to such payments.
For the woman who conceives with a man who views pregnancy as her problem,
mandatory preglimony is the only way to guarantee that she will receive muchneeded support. Isn’t she exactly the type of woman Motro is trying to help?

166.

See discussion, supra, Part VI.

